



# UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
United States Patent and Trademark Office  
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450  
www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/843,495	04/25/2001	Ezhilan Narasimhan	SUN-P6114-MEG	9277
28422	7590	02/28/2005	EXAMINER	
HOYT A. FLEMING III P.O. BOX 140678 BOISE, ID 83714			JACOBS, LASHONDA T	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2157	

DATE MAILED: 02/28/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

**Advisory Action  
Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief**

Application No.

09/843,495

Applicant(s)

NARASIMHAN ET AL.

Examiner

LaShonda T Jacobs

Art Unit

2157

**--The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --**

THE REPLY FILED 11 February 2005 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE.

1. ☐ The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to filing a Notice of Appeal. To avoid abandonment of this application, applicant must timely file one of the following replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit, or other evidence, which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in compliance with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114. The reply must be filed within one of the following time periods:

- a) ☐ The period for reply expires \_\_\_\_\_ months from the mailing date of the final rejection.  
b) ☒ The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection.

Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).

Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**NOTICE OF APPEAL**

2. ☐ The reply was filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing an appeal brief. The Notice of Appeal was filed on \_\_\_\_\_. A brief in compliance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be filed within two months of the date of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 CFR 41.37(a).

**AMENDMENTS**

3. ☐ The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because  
(a) ☐ They raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below);  
(b) ☐ They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below);  
(c) ☐ They are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or  
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims.

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_. (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).

4. ☐ The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121. See attached Notice of Non-Compliant Amendment (PTOL-324).  
5. ☐ Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): \_\_\_\_\_.  
6. ☐ Newly proposed or amended claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).  
7. ☐ For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) ☐ will not be entered, or b) ☐ will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended.

The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:

Claim(s) allowed: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) objected to: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) rejected: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: \_\_\_\_\_.

**AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE**

8. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but before or on the date of filing a Notice of Appeal will not be entered because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and sufficient reasons why the affidavit or other evidence is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).  
9. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to overcome all rejections under appeal and/or appellant fails to provide a showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1).  
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation of the status of the claims after entry is below or attached.

**REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER**

11. ☒ The request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:  
See Continuation Sheet.  
12. ☒ Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.  
13. ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Hare and Knudsen disclose substantially the invention as broadly claimed. In addition, the applicant asserted that neither Hare nor Knudsen disclose the limitations of claim 1. The examiner disagrees with the precedent assertion. The applicants did not provide a clear distinction between the references used in the rejection and the invention as claimed. All the Applicants have done was paraphrased the corresponding mapping limitations as indicated by the examiner. Applicants admitted that the definition provided by the the computer dictionary wherein "a rule is a statement that can be used to verify premises and to enable a conclusion to be drawn" is similar to the description provided in the specification, wherein the data could include "red", "yellow, and "green" and wherein the rule could include, if automobile color = red, then value =100. Based on the analysis provided by the applicants in page 9 of the applicants' arguments, such claimed element "entering a rule on a computer" is old and well known in the computer art. Moreover, the aforementioned assertion wherein Hare and Knudsen fail to teach applicant's claimed element "entering a rule on a computer", was unsupported by objective factual evidence and was not found to be substantial evidential value. The limitation the Applicants are relied upon is already admitted to be old and well known in the art. The arguments as to whether a rule is a statement that can be used to verify premises and to enable a conclusion to drawn, wherein "if automobile color =red, then value =100, wherein the premise of the above rule is "if automobile color =red, then the value =100 is already admitted by the applicants to be a well known feature in the technology art. However, Applicants are interpreting the claims very narrow using the specification without considering the broad teaching of the reference stated in the rejection. Applicants cannot rely on the specification to impart to the claims limitations not recited therein. Such reliance is ineffective to define over the prior art. In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 113 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1957); In re Winklans, 188 USPQ 129 (CCPA 1975). Applicant is further reminded of the clear difference between reading the claims in light of the specification as allowed by 35 U.S.C. 112, 6th paragraph, and by In re Donaldson 29 USPQ2d, 1845, 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir, 1994), and reading limitations of the specification into the claims In re Prater 415 F.2d 1393, 162 USPQ 541 (CCPA 1969). Applicants are reminded that the examiner is entitled to the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims. The Applicants always have the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution and broad interpretation by the examiner reduces the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Prater 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969).

Applicants asserted that they are not aware of any knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in art provide a motivation to combine Hare with Knudsen. In response, the examiner disagrees with the preceding allegations. However, Applicants are interpreting the claim very narrow without considering the broad teaching of the references used in the rejection. Applicants are reminded that the test for obviousness is not whether the features of one reference may be bodily incorporated into the other to produce the claimed subject matter but simply what the combination of references makes obvious to one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Furthermore, the examiner recognizes that references cannot be arbitrarily combined and that there must be some reason why one skilled in the art would be motivated to make the proposed combination of primary and secondary references. In re Nomiya USPQ 607 (CCPA 1975). On the other hand, there is no requirement that a motivation to make the modification be expressly articulated. The test for combining references is what the combination of disclosures taken as a whole would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re McLaughlin, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971). References are evaluated by what they suggest to one versed in the art, rather than by their specific disclosures. In re Bozek, 163 USPQ 545 (CCPA) 1969. As per Applicants' arguments that all claim limitations be taught or suggested by the prior art, Applicants appear to misinterpret the guidance given under MPEP 2142. In particular, references are evaluated by what they suggest to one versed in the art, rather than by their specific disclosures. In re Bozek, 163 USPQ 545 (CCPA) 1969.

There are numerous court decisions supporting the position given above. The issue of obviousness is not determined by what the references expressly state but by what they would reasonably suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art, as supported by decisions In re Delisle 406 Fed 1326, 160 USPQ 806; In re Kell, Terry and Davies 208 USPQ 871; and In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074, 5 USPQ 2d 1596, 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Citing In re Lalu, 747 F.2d 703, 705, 223 USPQ 1257, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Further, it was determined In re Lamberti et al., 192 USPQ 278 (CCPA) that:


- (a) obviousness does not require absolute predictability;
- (b) non-preferred embodiments of prior art must also be considered; and
- (c) the question is not express teaching of references, but what they would suggest.

(B). According to In re Jacoby, 135 USPQ 317 (CCPA 1962), the skilled artisan is presumed to know something more about the art than only what is disclosed in the applied references. In re Bode, 193 USPQ 12 (CCPA 1977), every reference relies to some extent on knowledge of persons skilled in the art to complement, that which is disclosed therein.

Furthermore, the skilled artisan would not consider the prior art embodiments in a vacuum, but would have had the motivation to combine the advantageous features of the prior art in the manner purported by the examiner for the reasons and motivations given above as well as in the prior office action. Thus the combined teachings of Hare and Knudsen when considered as a whole to one of ordinary skill in the art make obvious that Applicants dispute. Hence the 35 U.S.C 103 is hereby sustained.

Applicants asserted that they understood that users transmit data to web servers on a routine basis and that programmers routinely utilize rules to create function (subroutines, so they are no aware of any teaching, whether in the cited prior art or otherwise that indicates that sending data to a server can be combined with a programming language to send rules to a server and to generate function(subroutines) based on the received rule to a server, wherein sending data such as red, yellow or green to a server is very different from sending a rule to a server. There is no mentioned of such limitation in the claims. It is reminded that Applicants cannot rely on the specification to impart to the claims limitations not recited therein. Such reliance is ineffective to define over the prior art. In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 113 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1957); In re Winklans, 188 USPQ 129 (CCPA 1975). Applicant is further reminded of the clear difference between reading the claims in light of the specification as allowed by 35 U.S.C. 112, 6th paragraph, and by In re Donaldson 29 USPQ2d, 1845, 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir, 1994), and reading limitations of the specification into the claims In re Prater 415 F.2d 1393, 162 USPQ 541 (CCPA 1969). Applicants are reminded that the examiner is entitled to the broadest reasonable

interpretation of the claims. The Applicants always have the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution and broad interpretation by the examiner reduces the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Prater 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969).

  
ARIELLE  
SUPERVISORY PATENT EXAMINER  
TECHNOLOGY CENTER 2100